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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Brian Calder Kerr, (“Appellant” or “Kerr”), appeals the district court’s “Opinion on 
Appeal” wherein the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s May 31, 2016 Memorandum 
Decision (“Memorandum Decision”) (R., pp.17-21).  Simply stated, Kerr asserts that the district 
court and the magistrate court erred by concluding that under Idaho Code § 36-1303(b) an 
already harvested big game animal, regardless of whether it was lawfully killed on public 
ground, and where Kerr plead guilty to trespassing on private ground for the purpose of 
retrieving the expired animal, was properly confiscated by the Idaho Department of Fish and 
Game (“Fish and Game”).  Kerr further asserts that Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i) are 
unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable as to Mr. Kerr. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 14, 2016, the appellant, Kerr, pled guilty to trespass to retrieve wildlife, a 
misdemeanor violation of Idaho Code § 36-1603(a). (R., p.12.)  Kerr admitted to entering onto 
private property to retrieve a bull elk that he had lawfully killed on public ground.  As part of 
that plea deal, the State struck the $750.00 civil and processing penalty, mandated by Idaho Code 
§ 36-1404(a) for “illegal possession” of an elk, from Kerr’s written plea agreement.  At the 
sentencing hearing, the State urged the Court to include in its sentence and judgment an order for 
confiscation of the elk under Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).  Kerr vehemently opposed the State’s 
request for a confiscation order. 
Following a discussion on the issue, the magistrate court granted Kerr an opportunity to 
submit additional briefing on the issue. (R., pp.10-11).  On April 11, 2016, Kerr submitted 
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briefing arguing that for confiscation to be appropriate, the evidence must show an unlawful 
taking [and that], [h]ere it does not.”  See April 11, 2016 Supplemental Brief (“Supp. Brief”), pp. 
2-3.  Kerr’s arguments focused on the fact that he had lawfully harvested the elk before the 
trespass (and, therefore, had already “taken” the elk).  Id.  Kerr also argued that he did not plead 
guilty to illegal or unlawful possession of the elk. 
Specifically, and in support of that argument, Kerr proffered that “[t]he State did not 
charge Kerr with the unlawful taking or killing of wildlife,” that “[t]he evidence presented 
demonstrate[d] that Mr. Kerr lawfully took--killed the bull elk” and that this was highlighted by 
the fact that “the State struck the $750.00 civil and processing penalty, mandated by Idaho Code 
§ 36-1404(a) for ‘illegal possession’ of an elk, from Kerr’s written plea agreement and limited 
his guilty plea to trespass. Id.  Again, evidencing the fact the State was not claiming that he 
unlawfully harvested or unlawfully “possessed” the elk and further evidence that he had already 
“taken” the elk at the time he trespassed to retrieve the big game animal.1  Kerr asserted that the 
only bad acts alleged by the State are that Kerr unlawfully trespassed to retrieve an elk that he 
lawfully harvested, i.e., “took.”  Id.  Significantly, the State did not respond to Kerr’s briefing.  
On May 10, 2016, the Court took the matter under advisement and, on May 31, 2016, issued the 
Memorandum Decision that is the subject of the present appeal.  (R., pp.17-21).   
                                                 
1 Indeed, as pointed out in Kerr’s supplemental briefing and in the record, Kerr was properly 
licensed and held the necessary tag for taking the animal.  Further, his statement to law 
enforcement, corroborated by an objective third party, was that he shot the elk on public land and 
that it then moved into a field (private property) where it expired.  See Supp. Brief, pp. 2-3;   
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Ultimately, the magistrate court rejected Kerr’s argument.  The magistrate court reasoned 
the State could ignore the question of whether Kerr’s harvesting of the bull elk was lawful and 
that the State could merely confiscate the elk on the basis of the after-the-fact trespass with intent 
to retrieve regardless of what happened prior to the trespass and regardless of whether Kerr could 
“take” something that he had already “taken.”  Specifically, the magistrate judge admitted that 
Kerr’s legal harvesting of the bull elk was a “factual dispute [that] was not resolved by the 
Court” because, in the words of the magistrate judge, “it was not necessary to Kerr’s plea of 
guilty to the charge.”  (R., p.18 (Memorandum Decision, p.2).)  Significant for this appeal, the 
magistrate judge clearly recognized the fact that the prosecutor made a calculated decision to not 
“charge Kerr with illegally taking [or possessing] the elk but exercised his discretion to prosecute 
[only] the trespass in order to resolve the case.”  Id.  However, the magistrate court did not find 
that the prosecutor’s discretionary act had any pragmatic effect on whether the state could pursue 
confiscation.   
Ultimately, after specifically declining to make any factual determination on the question 
of whether the underlying “taking” was illegal, the magistrate judge applied Idaho Code 
§ 36-1404(b) to the trespass ignoring any evidence and refusing to make any finding as to 
whether the underlying harvest of the elk, the first “taking” was unlawful.  (R., p.19 
(Memorandum Decision, p.3).)  As explained more fully below, the magistrate court’s ruling is 




The magistrate court pronounced that its ruling focused entirely on Kerr’s trespass 
concluding that because “Kerr’s actions in trespassing were unlawful” and that because “take” 
has an “expansive definition” per Idaho Code § 36-202(i), citing the “variety of ways in which 
Kerr may have taken the elk,” and that Kerr’s subsequent trespass to get to the deceased elk also 
constituted a taking, that Kerr’s trespass subjected the elk to confiscation.  Significantly, 
however, the magistrate court indirectly recognized the problem of creating the impossible 
circumstance of two “takings” and the question of whether Kerr could “unlawfully take” an 
animal that he had already been “lawfully taken” per Idaho Code § 36-202(i). (R., pp.19-20 
(Memorandum Decision, pp.3-4).)   
The magistrate judge addressed this inconsistency i.e., impossible physics, in two ways.  
First, the magistrate judge attempted to avoid the physical inconsistency and ambiguity of “two 
takings” and/or “retaking from oneself” by concluding that the initial act of shooting the elk was 
not, by itself, a separate act of taking.  Rather, the magistrate judge reasoned that “it was in the 
very act of trespassing that Kerr was able to accomplish the [first] taking – that is, except for his 
trespass, Kerr never possessed the elk.”  (R., p.20 (Memorandum Decision, p.4).)  As explained 
below, this is inconsistent with the plain language of Sections 36-1404(b) and 36-202(i) and with 
Kerr’s plea.  And, to the extent this is the basis for the magistrate court’s ruling, it is irreversible 
error in the application of the statute.   
Second, in what seems inconsistent with any attempt to address the impossible physics of 
taking something already taken, the magistrate court reasoned that the physical impossibility of 
two takings did not matter:  “Under the broad definition of ‘take’ it is also true that Kerr did a 
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taking when he shot or killed the elk.  The fact that he took the elk by shooting it (perhaps prior 
to trespassing if his account is to be believed) does nothing to diminish or wash away the taint of 
the [second] taking Kerr engaged in when he trespassed to possess the elk.”  (R., p.20 
(Memorandum Decision, p.4).) Here, the magistrate judge appears to be saying that per the 
statute there could be multiple “takings” even if physically impossible, and that as long as one of 
the “takings” is illegal, the animal is subject to confiscation.  
Ultimately, based on one reasoning or the other, the magistrate court concluded:  “Kerr 
could not possess th[e] elk without committing the illegal act of trespass [and] [a]ccordingly, 
under I.C. § 36-1304(b), the elk shall remain confiscated by the Department of Fish and Game, 
and Kerr’s request to reconsider [the confiscation] is denied.”  (R., pp.21-22 (Memorandum 
Decision, p.5-6).)  And, indeed, it is this determination that is the foundation of the present 
appeal and that Kerr submits is a misapplication of the law and the basis for claiming the 
statutory scheme is unconstitutionally ambiguous and vague.  
Kerr appealed the magistrate court’s ruling.  And, on July 12, 2016, Kerr filed a notice of 
appeal, asserting two issues on appeal: 1) did the magistrate court misapply Idaho Code § 36-
1304(b) and § 36-202(i) and 2) are “Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i) unconstitutionally 
vague and unenforceable as to Mr. Kerr?” (R., pp.44-46).  
Following briefing on these issues, Judge Scott, district court judge for the Fourth 
Judicial District, heard oral argument.  On that same day, December 19, 2017, the district court 
issued its Opinion on Appeal.  (R., pp.35-42).  In that ruling, the district court acknowledged 
Kerr’s argument that the statute allowed for a physical impossibility--“taking” an animal 
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multiple times: “[Kerr’s] principal argument is that, by shooting the elk lawfully, he ‘took’ it 
lawfully, and because the same elk logically can’t be ‘taken’ twice, the elk he shot wasn’t ‘taken’ 
again when he unlawfully gained possession of it by trespassing on cultivated private land to 
retrieve it.” (R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p.5).)  And, like the magistrate judge below, the 
district court appreciated the confusion that attaches to Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i) 
when trying to understand what constitutes a taking under Idaho fish and game law: 
As already noted, “take” is a statutorily defined term.  Its meaning is very broad 
and isn’t synonymous with “kill” (though that is one way to “take” an elk).  I.C. § 
36-202(i). Of course an elk can’t be killed more than once.  But, given the 
statutory definition of “take,” the same elk can be “taken” multiple times.  Indeed, 
Kerr first “took” the elk by “hunting” it, even before he shot it.  See I.C. § 36-
202(i) (providing that to “hunt” is to “take”); I.C. § 36-202(j) (defining “hunting” 
essentially as trying to capture or kill wildlife, whether successful or not).  He 
may well have “taken” the elk a second time by “pursuing” it (if it happened to 
have been necessary for him to pursue the elk after seeing it but before shooting 
it).  Then he “took” it another time by “shooting” it, perhaps another time by 
“killing” it (if shooting it alone weren’t enough to cause its death), and still 
another time by “pursuing” the dying elk on cultivated private land.  Finally, he 
“took” the elk by “possession” it.   
 
(R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p. 5).) 
Regardless of this appreciation, the district court ultimate agreed with the magistrate 
judge and concluded that “[b]y his own admission, Kerr acted unlawfully in gaining possession 
of the elk he shot” and that “the magistrate’s decision was correct and Kerr’s appeal fails” for 
this reason alone.  (R., p.38 Opinion on Appeal, p.4 (emphasis added).)   
As set forth more fully below, the district court’s focus on “possession” as the basis for 
upholding the magistrate court’s ruling fails to appreciate circumstances of this case and ignores 
the construction problems for both “take” and “possession.”  Significantly, as set forth below, 
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“possession” is included in the definition of “take.” See Idaho Code § 36-202(i).  Thus, if you 
“possess” wildlife, you are deemed to have “taken” wildlife, or in this case “re-taken” wildlife.  
Perhaps even more significant, the district court ignored that fact that as part of his plea deal, the 
prosecutor struck the $750.00 civil and processing penalty, mandated by Idaho Code § 36-
1404(a) for ‘illegal possession’ of an elk, from Kerr’s written plea agreement”--a tacit 
acknowledgement by the State that Ker’s wrong doing was limited to the act of “trespass” and 
had nothing to do with “possession.”  Stated differently, for purposes of application, the State 
cannot enter a plea deal that focuses on “trespass” and that for the purposes of conviction 
removes “illegal possession” and then bootstrap in the alleged “illegal possession” after-the-fact 
because “possession” is one of the definitions of “take” under the confiscation statute.  As 
explained below, this interpretation is a flawed and requires an illogical and nonsensical 
application of statutory language.  Moreover, this nonsensical application makes the already 
ambiguous and vague statutory scheme even more ambiguous and vague and is another basis for 




ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
I. Is Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), read together with the definition provided in 
Idaho Code § 36-202(i), unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable?  
II. Did the Magistrate Court misapply Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), where there 
was no finding that the Appellant took game illegally (or illegally possessed game) prior 





I. Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) And § 36-202(i) Are Impermissibly Vague On Their Face And 
Vague As Applied To The Facts Of This Case 
A. Introduction 
The void for vagueness doctrine is an aspect of due process requiring the meaning of a 
criminal statute be determinable.  See State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 
(1998) (citing Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1984)).  Due process requires 
that all “be informed as to what the State commands or forbids” and that “men of common 
intelligence” not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law.  Id. (citing Smith v. 
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).  Accordingly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, premised 
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining 
criminal conduct or imposing civil sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and the statute must be worded 
in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  See Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497–99 (1982); State v. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34, 
218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct. App. 2009).  “Thus, a statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it 
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the 
statute.”  Burton v. State, Dep't of Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (Ct. App. 
2010).  “A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a 
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complainant's conduct.”  Id.  Here, the statute is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as 
applied to the facts of his case.  
B. Standard Of Review 
In an appeal from a final judgment of a magistrate court following an appeal to a district 
court sitting as an appellate court, subsequent appellate courts review the record of the magistrate 
court independently of the decision of the district court.  State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 628, 67 
P.3d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2003).   
The standard of review applicable to constitutional challenges on appeal is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found.  See State v. Julian, 129 
Idaho 133, 135, 922 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1996).  Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Quick Transport, Inc., 134 Idaho 240, 
244, 999 P.2d 895, 899 (2000). 
C. The Question Of Vagueness Was Raised Below As Evidenced By The Magistrate 
Court’s Memorandum Decision And, Even If It Was Not, The Issue Can Be 
Considered On Appeal 
As a threshold matter, Kerr addresses the issue of whether this issue is properly before 
this Court on appeal.  Although this Court exercises free review, Kerr appreciates that the district 
court claimed that Kerr “simply didn’t raise [the void for vagueness argument] in front of the 
magistrate” and, accordingly, refused to address the merits of the argument.  Directly stated, Kerr 
asserts that the district court is mistaken and directs this Court to the language of the May 31, 
2016 Memorandum Decision.  Indeed, the magistrate court acknowledged that “Kerr’s other 
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argument” was whether “the Legislature did not specifically detail the application of I.C. § 36-
1304(b)….”  (See R., p.21 (Memorandum Decision, p. 5).) Whether the Idaho Legislature erred 
by not providing specific detail for the application of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) is a void for 
vagueness argument.  Accordingly, the issue was raised below, and the district court’s 
determination that the issue was not raised below is without basis.   
Even if the issue was not raised below, the void for vagueness issue could have been 
raised by the district court and can be addressed by this Court now.  It is well-established that 
Idaho appellate courts consider a claim of error to which no objection was made below if the 
issue presented rises to the level of fundamental error.  See e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).  
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an 
appellate court should reverse an unobjected-to error when the defendant persuades the court that 
the alleged error:  (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) 
is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 221, 245 P.3d at 
978. Thus, here, even if Kerr failed to raise “vagueness” below, the failure constitutes 
fundamental error because it violates an unwaived constitutional right (Due Process), the error is 
clear and obvious from the record with no need of additional information, and there can be no 
question that the alleged error affected the outcome of the proceeding.  Significantly, the district 
court claimed that the “constitutional right” was waived, because “Kerr failed to argue before the 
magistrate that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.”  (R., p.42 (Opinion on 
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Appeal, p.8).) This reasoning makes no sense.  If a criminal defendant “waives” his 
constitutional rights by not raising them at the trial court level, then there would be no basis for 
the “fundamental error doctrine” because no criminal defendant could overcome the first prong 
of the test--showing that the error he did not raise below was not raised.  Moreover, that 
approach is not supported by case law.      
In State v. Black, 1999 Lexus ES300, 45 Kan. App. 2d 168, 175–76, 244 P.3d 1274, 1280 
(2011), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the same issue.  In that case, the appellant asserted 
that a Kansas forfeiture statute “is unconstitutionally vague” claiming that “the statute does not 
provide explicit standards for the court to use when deciding whether the forfeiture was grossly 
disproportionate.” Id.  Significantly, the state argued that the appellate “court should not consider 
the issue since [Appellant] is raising it for the first time on appeal…”  The Kansas high court 
rejected the argument because it concluded that the “vagueness argument addresses [appellant’s] 
due-process rights, so he has met an exception to the general rule, and this court can decide the 
issue.” Id.  Similarly, here, regardless of whether Kerr raised the issue below, the issue of 
whether Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i) are vague is properly before this Court.  As in 
Black, the claim involves Kerr’s unwaived rights of Due Process, the claim of error is clear 
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record, and, finally, the claim of error incontrovertibly affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings--here the sentencing.   
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D. Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) And § 36-202(i) Are Vague Because They Fail To 
Provide Fair Notice That Kerr’s Bad Act Of Trespassing Combined With His 
Prior Lawful Acts Subjected The Elk To Confiscation 
To prove vagueness, Kerr must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that his 
conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that law enforcement had 
unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge him.  See, e.g., Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 
218 P.3d at 14; Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240 P.3d at 935.  Here, that after Kerr had lawfully 
taken and possessed an elk, whether his subsequent trespass, subjected him to the confiscation 
statute.  The following addressing the statute’s failure to provide fair notice to Kerr that his 
trespass would result in the confiscation. 
The statute at issue states as follows: 
B.  Unlawfully Taken Wildlife--Seizure, Confiscation, Disposition. 
(i) The director or any other officer empowered to enforce the fish 
and game laws may at any time seize and take into his custody any 
wildlife or any portion thereof which may have been taken 
unlawfully, or which may be unlawfully in the possession of any 
person.  If it appears from the evidence before the magistrate 
hearing the case that said wildlife was unlawfully taken, the 
magistrate shall: 
 
(2) Order the same confiscated or sold by the director 
and the proceeds deposited in the fish and game 
account…. 
See Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).   
Idaho Code § 36-202 definitions applicable to Section 36-1304(b) and as to the term 
“take” provides as follows: 
(i) “Take” means hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill, 
or possess or any attempt to so do. 
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See Idaho Code § 36-202(i).  
Here, the initial question is whether the statute provides fair notice in light of the conduct 
at issue.  Significantly, there can be no real debate that when Kerr shot the elk, per the definition 
above, he “took” the elk.  And, indeed, if that “take” had been unlawful, it is conceded that 
confiscation would have been proper and that Kerr, again, per the language of the statute, would 
have had fair notice.  However, Kerr was not charged with and did not plead to that charge.  Kerr 
pled to Idaho Code § 36-1603 (“Trespassing on cultivated lands”).  That code section states that, 
“No person shall enter the real property of another…for the purpose of hunting, retrieving 
wildlife, fishing or trapping, without the permission of the owner or person in charge of the 
property….”  Idaho Code § 36-1603.   
Here, Kerr pled guilty to trespassing for the purpose of retrieving wildlife (an elk) that, 
pursuant to the plain language of the statute, he had already lawfully taken.  The State confirmed 
that understanding when it: 1) the State did not charge Kerr with the “unlawful taking or killing 
of wildlife” and 2) struck the civil penalties associated with “illegal possession” of a big game 
animal from Kerr’s written plea agreement.  Given this understanding--that Kerr was not being 
prosecuted for “illegal possession,”--a fact not appreciated by the district court--and where the 
statute makes clear that Kerr lawfully “took” the elk when he shot and killed the elk, it is simply 
not reasonable to believe that Kerr had the requisite notice to believe he, or anyone else that 
lawfully harvests an animal that unfortunately happened to die on private property, would be 
subject to confiscation if they trespassed to get to the animal and pled guilty to a trespass.  And, 
indeed, if Kerr has not trespassed, Kerr would have been subject to other fish and game statutory 
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violations including “waste”: Idaho Code § 36-1202 makes it illegal to “fail to properly dress and 
care for any game animal killed” and to “to fail to take or transport [edible portions] to [the 
hunter’s] camp within twenty-four hours.”  See Idaho Code § 36-1202(c) and (c)(2). 
Again, the statute gives authority to confiscate “wildlife or any portion thereof which 
may have been taken unlawfully.”  See Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).  In this case, it is 
incontrovertible fact that Kerr had already lawfully “taken” the animal.  Thus, it is not reasonable 
for him to believe that he could be penalized for what would have to be a second “taking.”  In the 
words of the Idaho Court of Appeals, “[p]ersons of ordinary intelligence can only guess at the 
statute’s directive in this circumstance.”  See Burton, 149 Idaho 746 at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.  
Accordingly, the statute is ambiguous and fails to provide requisite notice.  
This ambiguity is highlighted by the magistrate judge’s ruling attempting to apply this 
vague and ambiguous statutory scheme.  Indeed, the magistrate court concedes that per the 
statute, the initial legal harvesting of the animal, constituted a legal “taking.”  See Memorandum 
Decision, p. 4 (“Under the broad definition of ‘take’ it is also true that Kerr did a taking when he 
shot or killed the elk.”).  And, indeed, the magistrate court clearly struggled with the practical 
impossibility of a person “taking” and “retaking” from himself.  Consequently, here, if the legal 
applicability of the statute is difficult for the learned magistrate judge, the language clearly “fails 
to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence.”  See Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240 
P.3d at 935.  Similarly, district court’s attempt at application reveals the same thing--attempting 
to explain how a hunter “takes” an elk, the district court provides this unreasonable and 
unhelpful explanation based on the statutory language:  The hunter can first “take” the “elk ‘by 
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hunting’ it, even before he shot it” … “[h]e may well have ‘taken’ the elk a second time by 
‘pursing’ it (if it happened to have been necessary for him to pursue the elk after seeing it before 
shooting it)”…. and that he “‘took’ it another time by “shooting” it, perhaps another time by 
‘killing’ it (if shooting it alone weren’t enough to cause its death), and still another time by 
“pursing” the dying elk onto cultivated private land.”  (R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p. 5).)  This 
is not the type of nonsensical legal-connect-the-dots meta-physical hypothetical that people of 
ordinary intelligence should be expected to parse.     
E. Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) Is Unconstitutionally Vague Because It Allows For 
Arbitrary And Discriminatory Enforcement 
Per, United States Supreme Court legal precedent, the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires a statute to be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.  See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497–99.  Here, as highlighted by 
Kerr’s situation, the very language of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) allows for arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement because the confiscation statute and related definitions are so broad 
and inclusive that they included virtually any wrongful act associated with big game hunting. 
Indeed, the reasoning of the magistrate court and district court, taken to its logical end, means 
that any wrongful act, regardless of how minor, committed by any individual involved in the 
activity of hunting or trapping, would subject the malfeasor in possession of a legally harvested 
animal subject to confiscation.   
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II. The Magistrate Court Erred In Its Application Of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b)  
A. Introduction 
The magistrate court erred in its application of the confiscation statute to the facts of this 
case and the plea deal.  Significantly, the magistrate court indirectly recognized the problem of 
creating the impossible circumstance of two “takings” and the question of whether Kerr could 
“unlawfully take” an animal that he had already “lawfully taken” per Idaho Code § 36-202(i).  
The magistrate judge addressed this inconsistency in two ways, first, by concluding that the 
initial act of shooting the elk was not, by itself, a separate act of taking, that but rather “it was in 
the very act of trespassing that Kerr was able to accomplish the [first] taking – that is, except for 
his trespass, Kerr never possessed the elk.”  Id. at p. 4.  This is plainly inconsistent with the 
language of Sections 36-1404(b) and 36-202(i).  Second, the magistrate court concluded that 
there were two takings of the same animal and that because the second “retaking” was illegal, 
confiscation for the second taking was permissible under the statute.  This application is also 
erroneous and is a basis for reversal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
As set forth above, Idaho courts acting in appellate capacity exercise free review over 
questions of statutory interpretation and application.  See Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 
Idaho 9, 15, 232 P.3d 330, 336 (2010) (citations omitted).   
On review, “[a]n unambiguous statute must be given its plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning.  Statutory provisions should not be read in isolation but instead are interpreted in the 
context of the entire document.”  Id.  Here, in the event that this Court finds the statute 
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unambiguous, Kerr asserts the magistrate court and district court erred in their application of 
Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).   
C. The Magistrate Court’s Conclusion That Shooting And Killing Of The Elk Was 
Not A Taking Is Inconsistent With The Plain Language Of The Statute 
Simply stated, the magistrate judge erred by concluding that the initial act of shooting the 
elk was not, by itself, a separate act of taking, that but rather “was in the very act of trespassing 
that Kerr was able to accomplish the [first] taking – that is, except for his trespass, Kerr never 
possessed the elk.”  Id. at p. 4.  This is inconsistent with the plain language of Sections 36-
1404(b) and 36-202(i) and ignores Title 36 taken as a whole.  Idaho Code § 36-202(i) defines 
“take” as “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill or possess or any attempt to 
do so.”  These broad definitions mean that Kerr’s act of shooting and killing the elk was, 
unquestionably an act of taking.  The magistrate court’s conclusion is, therefore, erroneous.2    
Significantly, the district court avoided this argument--an admission that the argument 
lacks merit.  Indeed, the district court recognized the impossibility, but concluded that any prior 
“taking” did not matter regardless of any impossibility because, ultimately, Kerr was in illegally 
possession of the elk and that this justified confiscation under the statute.  As explained 
immediately below, this argument adopted by both the magistrate court and the district court also 
fails. 
                                                 
2 In fairness to the magistrate court, he was asked to do the impossible, interpret an ambiguous 
statute that requires a ruling that is “physically inconsistent.”  And, it should be noted the 
magistrate court appears to reject its own argument--that there was only one taking that was not 
completed until Kerr committed the trespass. (See R., p.20 (Memorandum Decision, p.4).) 
(“Under the broad definition of ‘take’ it is also true that Kerr did a taking when he shot or killed 
the elk.”).   
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D. The Conclusion That There Were Two Takings That Resulted In An Illegal 
Possession That Authorized Confiscation Is Erroneous 
The magistrate judge gave a second basis for its application of the confiscation statute:  
“The fact that he [Kerr] took the elk by shooting it (perhaps prior to trespassing if his account is 
to be believed) does nothing to diminish or wash away the taint of the [second] taking Kerr 
engaged in when he trespassed to possess the elk.” (R., p.20 (Memorandum Decision, p.4).)  In 
essence, the magistrate judge appears to be saying that per the statute there could be multiple 
“physical takings” and that as long as Kerr committed the illegal act of trespass to retrieve, the 
animal is subject to confiscation.  It is this analysis that was adopted by the district court as well:  
“The fundamental problem with [Kerr’s] argument is that nothing in the stature suggests an elk 
can only be ‘taken’ once.”  (R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p.5).)   
As explained above, to the extent that this is the meaning of the language of the statute, 
the statute is ambiguous and fails to provide adequate notice.  Regardless, to the extent this is the 
lower courts’ interpretation of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202, it is erroneous.  A review 
of the statutory language of Title 36 clearly shows that the legislature did not intend for the 
unlawful taking penalties to be read into the “trespass to retrieve” statute.  Throughout Title 36, 
the legislature treated “unlawful taking” and “unlawful possession” much differently than 
“trespass to retrieve” and, accordingly, outlined specific penalties associated with those crimes.  
For example, the unlawful taking violation has detailed penalties associated with it, like possible 
felony conviction (Idaho Code § 36-1401(c)(3)), confiscation (Idaho Code § 36-1304(b)), and 
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civil monetary penalties (Idaho Code § 36-1404(a)).  The trespass to retrieve statute does not 
have these additional penalties and is outlined as a simple misdemeanor.   
If the legislature intended for trespass violations to have the same penalties as unlawful 
taking (i.e., confiscation and mandatory civil penalty), it could have done so, but it expressly 
declined.  However, the legislature did outline specific penalties for other types of trespassing 
violations.  See Idaho Code § 36-1402(e) (imposing mandatory hunting and fishing license 
revocation for “[t]respassing in violation of warning signs or failing to depart real property of 
another after notification”). By expressly excluding trespass to retrieve violations from enhanced 
penalties associated with unlawful taking or possession and failing to detail the application of the 
confiscation statute to “trespass to retrieve” violations, the Idaho Legislature obviously intended 
or at least created the possibility to exclude “trespass to retrieve” as an “unlawful taking” or 
“unlawful possession” for the purpose of confiscation.  See State v. Schoger, 148 Idaho 622, 629, 
226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (stating the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another under 
the statutory construction principle of inclusio unio est alterius).  And, in this case, this is 
significant because the State, as part of the plea deal, removed the taint of “illegal possession” 
when it struck the charge and removed all fines and penalties associated with “illegal 
possession.”  Thus, here, there is only a trespass, and there are no facts to support an illegal 
possession or an illegal taking.   
In short, the statutes at issue taken as a whole and applied to the facts of this case do not 
support the isolated reading and application decided upon by the magistrate court.  Accordingly, 




For the reasons set forth above, Kerr respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
magistrate court’s order denying the State’s request for an order of confiscation. 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2017.   
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